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The Acceptable Limits of State Interference in Private Property Rights
during Periods of Economic Crisis
Abstract: The power of the state to compulsorily acquire the privately held real property
of citizens is recognised in numerous developed democracies. However, the exercise of
this power remains extremely controversial. In most jurisdictions the state’s power to
compulsorily acquire private property is limited to instances of necessary public good. In
many instances, such as hospitals or railways, a necessary public good is clearly
identifiable. However, successive United States Supreme Court judgments have
expanded the definition of public good to include redevelopment which is primarily to
the benefit of another private party. The Supreme Court judgment in Kelo v City of New
London sparked a political outcry which led to severe limitations being placed on the
power of state authorities to compulsorily acquire property for private redevelopment.
Given the jurisprudence of the Irish Supreme Court in cases such as Clinton v An Bord
Pleanála and others it is likely that the attitude of the Irish courts would be similar to that
of their American counterparts in Kelo. Proponents of the Coase Theorem argue that the
state should take a secondary role in such property disputes, leaving resolution to be
achieved through private bargaining between the parties. However, this approach is
predicated on an illusion of minimal transaction cost. The effectiveness of such an
approach also declines as the distance between the parties to the transaction increases.
Furthermore, property rights cannot be understood in purely economic terms. The role
of law must be to delineate property rights in a manner which takes account of, and
balances, private economic and other arguments such as community cohesion, economic
development and social justice concerns.
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The Acceptable Limits of State Interference in
Private Property Rights during Periods of Economic
Crisis
Ian Payne*

The limited right of the state to compulsorily acquire the privately held real property of
citizens is recognised in numerous developed market democracies.1 However, the
exercise of this power remains extremely controversial. In most jurisdictions the state’s
power to acquire property under this domain is limited to instances of necessary public
good. Article 8.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that instances
justifying such interference by the state include on the basis of national security, public
safety and the economic well‐being of the country.
A central problem in theorising the acceptable limits of such intervention remains the
competing concepts of public good, which inevitably change over time, and frequently
depend on circumstance. It will be demonstrated that the concept of “public good” has
been expanded over time to potentially include the compulsory conveyance of property
from one private party to another, where the state considers it economically or socially
expedient to do so. This essay will consider the role which law must play in regulating
competing notions of public good in order to provide a regime which balances a
requirement of justice with the goal of stable market expectations within an economy. In
doing so it will first be necessary to consider the role of compulsory acquisition in an Irish
and, briefly, in an American context.

I. PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN IRELAND
Bunreacht na hÉireann2 provides the basis for the recognition of private property in the
Irish legal order. Reference to private property rights appear in two distinct articles of the
Constitution. Article 43.1 provides that man has a right to the private ownership of
external goods. It further provides that the State shall pass no law attempting to abolish
this right of private ownership. However, this right is qualified by Article 43.2 which
provides that the rights outlined in Article 43.1 should be regulated by the principles of
social justice and, to that end, the State may delimit the exercise of such rights with a
view to reconciling their exercise with the exigencies of the common good. Furthermore,
Article 43 must be read in conjunction with Article 40.3 which – under the heading of
*
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Personal Rights – provides that the State shall, “in particular, by its laws protect as best it
may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the… property rights
of every citizen”.
It thus appears that private property rights, being mentioned in two distinct articles of
the Constitution, enjoy an extremely privileged place in Irish law. However, it is not the
case Irish law treats property rights as sacrosanct. J.M. Kelly’s, The Irish Constitution,
notes that “legislative restrictions on property rights are usually upheld by the courts,
with only a small minority of cases establishing an infringement of the constitutional
guarantee of private property”.3 Following Iarnród Éireann v Ireland4 it is now the
position of the Irish High Court that the provisions of the Constitution protecting private
property apply equally to corporate bodies as they do to human persons. The issues
addressed by Keane J. in the High Court have not yet been considered by the Supreme
Court. The extension of such constitutional protection to corporate bodies has been
criticised by the Irish Constitutional Review Group.5

II. THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING KELO
The right of the state to compulsorily acquire property in the USA was limited by the Fifth
Amendment, which came into effect in 1791 as part of the United States Bill of Rights.
The text of the Fifth Amendment includes, inter alia, the following provision.
No person… shall be… deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
The tying of private property rights, in the same provision, to the rights of life and liberty
demonstrates the sensitive nature of this bundle of rights. Any prospect of undue
interference with these rights has the potential to spark highly charged political debate.
The US Supreme Court has, for a considerable period of time, upheld the right of the
legislature to compulsorily acquire property under the Fifth Amendment, even in favour
of private parties, where the result is the delivery of a public benefit.6 However, the
decision of the Supreme Court to uphold the compulsory acquisition of private dwellings
by the City of New London in Kelo v City of New London7 sparked a political backlash not
experienced before in respect of this classic police power of the state.
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The dispute in Kelo arose from the decision of the City of New London to implement a
development plan in order to regenerate an area of the city which was suffering from
deprivation and mass unemployment. This required the compulsory acquisition of large
tracts of land in that area. The city’s population had declined almost thirty percent since
1960, and its unemployment level was twice the state average.8 The plan envisaged the
creation of new restaurants, stores and a museum. The anchor of the entire scheme was
a proposal to develop a $300 million Pfizer research facility.9 The case hinged on whether
it was constitutional for the City of New London to compulsorily acquire the property of
Susette Kelo, where the public benefit of such a seizure would be indirect. In this
instance it appeared that the direct, and majority, benefit would be to Pfizer. The
company would have a site secured on its behalf and would benefit from significant tax
breaks following the establishment of the research centre.
Delivering the judgment of the court, Justice Stevens held that it would not be
constitutional for the city to take property under a mere pretext of a public purpose.
However, the court determined that the taking in question was exercised in pursuance of
a “carefully considered” development plan which was not adopted “to benefit a
particular class of identifiable individuals”. Justice Stevens concluded that the Supreme
Court of the United States rejects the notion that in order for a taking to have public
benefit, the property in question must be literally put to any particular use for the
general public.
This Supreme Court judgment sparked a considerable outcry from conservative
supporters of private property rights. In her dissenting judgment, Justice Day O’Connor
stated,
Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party,
but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are
likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power…the
government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer
resources to those with more.
Justice Day O’Connor’s dissent continues to resonate with many Americans. Echoing her
judgment, a Wall Street Journal editorial in 2009 opined that the decision of the Court in
Kelo handed a ‘carte blanche’ to local government in order to seize private property for
economic development.10 The outcry which followed Kelo resulted in hasty legislative
change in many states. The conservative Institute for Justice claims that 43 of the states
of America have engaged either in substantive eminent domain reform or have increased
eminent domain protections in the wake of Kelo.11
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III. KELO IN AN IRISH CONTEXT
Although there has been no judgment by an Irish court in a case with facts identical to
those in Kelo, the Irish Supreme Court has considered compulsory acquisition in the
context of schemes which include a private dimension. In Clinton v An Bord Pleanála and
others12 Geoghegan J., in a unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court, held that a
compulsory acquisition by Dublin City Council, pursuant to a regeneration plan for
O’Connell Street, was constitutional notwithstanding the fact that the specific purpose to
which the site in question would be put was unclear, and notwithstanding the likelihood
that the regeneration would be achieved through a public‐private partnership.
Whereas, a case with the specific facts of Kelo has not yet arisen in Ireland, the
underlying arguments which it was necessary for the US Supreme Court to engage with in
that case are prominent in Irish political discourse. This is particularly so at this moment
in time, as the Government faces a public demand to do more in order to stimulate
employment at a time of economic crisis.
In February 2010 public controversy arose in Ireland following a proposal by Ryanair to
create 500 jobs in a facility at Dublin Airport. This offer was conditional on the current
tenants of the facility – Ryanair’s major competitor Aer Lingus – being forced to vacate
the property. At the time, the Government parties came under considerable pressure to
yield to Ryanair’s request, on the basis of economic expediency.13 However, the
Government refused to intervene in this manner. In March, Ryanair announced that the
500 jobs will be created at facilities outside of Ireland.14 It is clear that if the Government
had sought the compulsory acquisition of the facility at Dublin Airport, Aer Lingus would
have enjoyed the right to challenge that acquisition through the courts. Iarnród Éireann is
authority that corporations do enjoy property rights akin to human persons under
Bunreacht na hÉireann. However, it is not certain what the outcome of such a challenge
might be. It is stated above that, historically, the Irish Supreme Court has been largely
deferential to the legislature in instances of compulsory acquisition.
Rachael Walsh of Trinity College Dublin maintains that since Clinton the Irish courts are
on a path towards approving compulsory acquisitions whose primary consequence is the
conferring of benefit on private developers. Walsh continues, citing with approval Justice
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Day O’Connor in Kelo, that such a development may undermine the consonance of the
Irish property rights regime with social justice.15

IV. THE DANGER OF AN UNCHECKED STATE
Walsh may be correct in her concerns regarding compulsory acquisition for private
redevelopment in distinguishable instances. In Kelo, despite the compulsory acquisition
of property in an economically deprived area proceeding, the regeneration plan stalled.
The Pfizer investment never materialised and subsequently the company pulled out of
New London altogether costing 1,400 jobs.16 Arguably the episode resulted in the
destruction of a cohesive community while delivering no economic benefit. However, the
underlying substance of the assumption that compulsory acquisition for private
redevelopment is inherently incompatible with social justice is inadequate and cannot be
applied as a general rule.
The extent to which the state may legitimately interfere in regulating competing
property rights between individuals has long been a matter of debate between scholars
and in the courts. In Lochner v New York17 the US Supreme Court considered the extent
to which the New York State Legislature could be permitted to interfere in the contract
between a baker and his employee in respect of working conditions. In the instant case
the majority of the court held that a law which sought to limit the number of hours an
employee could work in a bakery per day was an “unreasonable, unnecessary and
arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the individual to contract”. However,
in his frequently cited dissenting judgment, Justice Holmes held that a judge’s agreement
or disagreement with a particular economic theory should not interfere with the right of
the majority to embody their opinions in law. Justice Holmes maintained that “the word
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural
outcome of dominant opinion”.

V. THE COASE THEOREM
Scholars of Law and Economics have often sought to minimise the role of the state, or
indeed the law, in regulating the economic interactions which take place between private
parties. In ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase introduced the
notion of private bargaining, based on clearly established property rights, as being
potentially more efficient than state intervention. Coase rejected the traditional
approach to legal rules whereby the question arising from the example of one party
inflicting harm on another is how to restrain the harm inflicting party. Instead, Coase
15
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maintains that the problem is reciprocal. Restraining the tortfeasor who is infringing the
rights of another party may in fact cause greater economic or social harm than restricting
the right of that other party to procure a remedy.
Coase applied his argument, with considerable effect, to the classic case of Sturges v
Bridgman.18 The case concerned an allegation of nuisance which arose when a doctor
extended his premises for the purposes of developing his private practice. The extension
so happened to border on the kitchen of his neighbour, a confectioner. The doctor
sought, and obtained, an injunction on the basis of the nuisance arising from the carrying
out of the confectioner’s business, which disrupted his medical practice. This was despite
the confectioner’s activity predating the construction of the doctor’s consultation room.
In ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Coase argued that a more efficient means of solving this
dispute would have been for the parties to bargain privately in order to achieve the most
economically efficient outcome.
“If the doctor’s income would have fallen more through continuance of
this machinery than it added to the income of the confectioner, there
would clearly be room for a bargain whereby the doctor paid the
confectioner to stop using the machinery”.19
Underlying the Coase Theorem, as it later became known, is an aspiration to minimise
transaction costs between parties in order that they may bargain privately. Ideally
transaction costs should reach zero. This approach continues to be a focus for many
scholars today in respect of the issues under discussion in this essay. The issue of
compensation is often central to finding a resolution acceptable to the different parties
involved in a compulsory acquisition dispute. Drawing on the example of Kelo and other
examples from the United Kingdom, Stephen Crow concluded, in ‘Compulsory Purchase
for Economic Development: An International Perspective’, that if an acquisition were to
take place on the basis of “truly voluntary negotiations” between equal parties, it is more
likely that the agreed price would include some element of the profits anticipated by the
developer of the site to be acquired.20 It is argued that such a resolution would be to the
benefit and the satisfaction of the party who is subject to a compulsory acquisition order.
Those who focus predominantly on transaction costs argue that greater equality in
bargaining could be achieved through policies which seek to minimise such externalities.
These sentiments are partly echoed in Robert Ellickson’s landmark text, Order Without
Law. In 1981, Ellickson travelled to Shasta County, California, in order to examine
whether the Coase Theorem – that portrays people as bargaining to mutual advantage
from whatever starting points the legal system has bestowed on them – applies to the
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reality of border and herding disputes in a rural context.21 Ellickson discovered that some
spheres of life do lie entirely beyond the shadow of the law. In respect of many disputes,
parties privately bargained a mutually acceptable solution irrespective of their applicable
legal rights. However, Ellickson also observed that as the magnitude of what is at stake,
or the distance between the parties, increased, disputants became increasingly likely to
turn to legal rules in order to resolve a dispute. Furthermore, despite appearing largely in
favour of private bargaining, Ellickson concedes in the concluding chapter that local
bargaining provides no basis for expecting that norms will serve corrective ends, such as
distributive justice, which policymakers may consider important or even necessary.22 It is
apparent that private bargaining does have natural limitations when applied to concrete
situations. Therefore, the role of the state, and of law, will often be imperative when
compulsory acquisition is considered necessary.

VI. DEFINING THE PUBLIC GOOD
An attempt to define the “public good” is important in the context of compulsory
acquisition as most jurisdictions limit such acquisitions to instances of necessary public
benefit. However, it is clear that in a heterogeneous society, concepts of public good are
constantly competing. In Lochner v New York, despite coming to entirely different
conclusions, both the majority of the court and Justice Holmes, dissenting, sought to
establish legal principles which were to the benefit of the public.
The Coase Theorem, which seeks to minimise transaction costs in order to encourage
private bargaining has natural limitations, as demonstrated by the short review of
Ellickson’s findings. It may provide a simple solution to many disputes; an effective
means of ensuring the most economically efficient outcome. However, an efficient
outcome is not always assured, and equally, the approach takes no account of the
corrective aspirations which are often identified by the legislature. Moreover, the
effectiveness of the theorem is based on the abstract notion of transaction costs being
extremely low. This limitation was not lost on Coase who himself emphasised that the
problem of welfare economics must “ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and
morals”.23 As Charles Tiebout has highlighted, issues cannot be decided entirely on the
basis of cost unless the social welfare function is also known.24
Furthermore, an unqualified application of the argument espoused by the majority in
Lochner v New York, which is reflected in the Coase Theorem, namely that parties should
bargain privately without the interference of the state, requires several assumptions
regarding property rights which do not necessarily hold true. As stated, parties can only
21
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bargain privately effectively where there exists a relative equality of bargaining power
between the parties. Moreover, each party must be able to, and be prepared to, place an
economic value on their particular rights. If this were always the case, there would never
be need for the state to interfere in order to regulate competing interests through
compulsory acquisition for private redevelopment. However, Janice Nadler and Shari
Diamond have identified that in many instances of compulsory acquisition, the party
resisting such acquisition is not simply a “hold out” seeking a more favourable economic
bargain but rather is a “hold in” – with a strong subjective attachment to their property.
Such parties may be unwilling to voluntarily sell their property at any price.25 This is
particularly so where there is no clearly defined public benefit arising from the
transaction, as is often the case where a property is acquired for private redevelopment
under a broad scheme of urban renewal.
For the Coase Theorem to be truly effective, in addition to requiring very low transaction
costs, it requires clearly established property rights. However, such inalienable property
rights do not exist. There are a plethora of regulatory interventions by the state which
define what one can and cannot do in respect of property over which one holds title.
Some scholars, such as Garrett Hardin, have suggested that an increase in the scope of
private property rights may overcome many of the social difficulties faced by society. This
is a position reflective of the majority judgment in Lochner. In ‘The Tragedy of the
Commons’, Hardin refers to the example of a herdsman who, as a rational actor, seeks to
maximise his gain, by increasing the size of his herd which grazes on the commons. If
each herdsman acts in this self interested fashion, which most inevitably will, without an
overarching governance structure, the eventual result will be the destruction of the
entire resource; in Hardin’s example, a common pasture.26 Many scholars have argued,
using Hardin’s thesis, that this tragedy, may be overcome by increased privatisation of
the commons.
However, deference to a rule of law which values privatisation over all other
considerations is likely to create as many problems as would the ‘Tragedy of the
Commons’ as outlined by Hardin. Friedrich von Hayek may be correct in some
circumstances that decentralisation to local experts is preferable to central state
intervention.27 However, this cannot satisfy the quandary, as outlined by Nadler and
Diamond, that in many instances a party who is subject to a compulsory purchase order
may value their property in subjective, even irrational, terms; and that in adopting such
an entrenched position, the wider society may suffer. This is likely to become particularly
pronounced at a time of economic crisis. The same concern can be applied equally in
respect of a law which permits the legislature to seize property on behalf of another
private party without requiring any demonstration of a necessary public benefit. This was
25
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the concern of Justice Day‐O’Connor in Kelo. However, in Kelo the learned judge’s
concern was misplaced.

VII. LAW AS AN UMPIRE
From the above it is clear that neither the extreme of fully privatised property rights, nor
of arbitrary state intervention can provide an adequate means of governance which
recognises the private rights of individuals but also takes cognisance of economic
efficiency and a desire for corrective justice. It is apparent that law can play a role as an
umpire in order to balance these competing rights. The law must delineate property
rights in a manner which takes account of private economic and other arguments such as
community cohesion, economic development, as well as social justice and morality
concerns.
This is an argument which is not lost on the judiciary. It is clear from the jurisprudence of
the Irish Supreme Court that the court takes seriously its role of acting as an umpire
between competing rights and notions of justice. In Tuohy v Courtney28 the Supreme
Court, echoing Justice Holmes in Lochner, held that the function of the Court is not to
substitute its view of the correct or desirable balance for that of the Oireachtas (the
legislature) but rather,
“To determine from an objective stance whether the balance contained in
the impugned legislation is so contrary to reason and fairness as to
constitute an unjust attack on some individual’s constitutional rights”
The doctrine of proportionality, outlined in Tuohy, is one of the most important examples
of the law acting as an umpire in order to ensure that a balanced outcome is arrived at in
respect of disputes regarding real property.
Critiquing the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’, Elinor Ostrom – in Governing the Commons:
The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action – provides the basis for a different
approach to regulatory governance, which rejects the rigid dichotomy between the
market and the state, espoused by scholars such as Hayek. Ostrom maintains that
neither the state nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain
long‐term, productive use of natural resource systems.29 The solution, according to
Ostrom, lies in the requirement for greater institutional diversity. She suggests that the
‘Tragedy of the Commons’ could also be avoided if the parties concerned were to make a
binding contract under which they commit themselves to a cooperative strategy mutually
agreed between the actors concerned.30 Ostrom provides the empirical example of
fisherman on a lake at Alanya, Turkey, as evidence of such a cooperative strategy in
28
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action. At Alanya, the local fishermen entered into an agreement regarding the
regulation of fishing rights on a local lake, which is a finite resource. Ostrom observed
that compliance with the system is regulated by the fishermen themselves and that each
fisherman’s rights, where infringed, are supported by everyone else in the system.31
For sure, Ostrom’s solution of a cooperative strategy to overcome disputes regarding
property rights cannot be truly effective in the context of a deeply embedded regime
which often ranks highly the right of land owners to exclude others from their property,
as exists in Ireland. The hypothesis is also rendered less effective as, by definition, the
entry of a private developer, through compulsory acquisition, introduces a new actor
who is not privy to the local cooperative strategy. However, the underlying importance of
institutional diversity, as a means of encouraging a greater balance of governance, is
particularly relevant to the compulsory acquisitions which have been considered in this
essay.
The irony of Kelo and Clinton is that the judgments in each go some way to satisfying
both those scholars, outlined above, who uphold the dichotomy between market and
state and also Ostrom. The very fact that the power of compulsory acquisition in Clinton
was delegated to a local authority, rather than exercised by the centralised state,
demonstrates that the Irish legal order does recognise the benefits of decentralising
authority to local experts who are better placed to make such decisions. However, the
exercise of these powers by local, rather than central, government also opens up space
for the cooperative institutional diversity which is espoused by Ostrom. The
strengthening of citizen participation in local governance would go a long way to
regulating the use of the eminent domain. This would help to ensure that compulsory
acquisitions only take place where they are of defined benefit to the overall community,
irrespective of whether the initial beneficiary of such development is a private actor. If
such participation were to become embedded, it is also likely that local government
decisions to compulsorily acquire private property for regeneration would not precipitate
the public outcry, or legislative reactionism, which followed Kelo in America, as decisions
would have greater democratic legitimacy.

VIII. THE ROLE OF LAW AS COGNITIVELY OPEN
However, embedded democratic local governance structures which seek to ensure the
best solution for the entire local polity cannot solve all disputes which arise from
compulsory acquisition. “Hold‐outs” and “hold‐ins” are likely to continue to act in a self
interested fashion irrespective of the whether a development scheme is supported by a
majority in their community. Therefore, it will never be possible to entirely oust the role
of law, as a final port of call, in balancing the rights of those parties who are in dispute.
In a heterogeneous society, the nature of property is constantly evolving. In 2005,
National Geographic highlighted that 20 percent of the human genome had been
31
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patented.32 The holding of this form of intellectual property could not have been
contemplated a generation previous. It is no longer possible for the courts, in balancing
the private rights of individuals and the state, within a constitutional framework, to
simply rely on the rule of law or to defer entirely to a welfarist state.
Nancy Fraser has also suggested that the traditional dichotomy of market versus state is
no longer relevant. She has stated that neither “reductive economism” nor “romanticised
society” can singularly provide a governance regime to meet the needs of a complex
society. Instead she suggests that a third variable must be introduced into the equation,
namely the search for emancipation. This third axis serves to cross‐cut the conflict
between marketisation and social protection; it does not inherently sway towards either
extreme. According to Fraser, the introduction of a variable which seeks emancipation
serves to “overcome forms of subjection rooted in society”. 33
It is clear that where local or private bargaining breaks down the role of the law, and by
extension of the courts, will become of central importance. In introducing a place for
emancipation, which the Irish courts do by way of the proportionality doctrine outlined
above, the Irish legal system seeks to act as the facilitator of an endless political
discourse, often dominated by extreme interests. It was demonstrated, by the fact that
the Irish Supreme Court has seldom struck down a law which seeks to acquire property
compulsorily, that the courts will in most cases defer to “majority rule”. However, as per
the Supreme Court in Tuohy, where majority rule is “so contrary to reason and fairness as
to constitute an unjust attack on some individual’s constitutional rights”, the role of the
State in regulating private property will be limited by the courts.

IX. CONCLUSION
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that property rights are not sacrosanct under
Irish law. In most instances where compulsory acquisition by the State, or an organ
thereof, has been contested before the courts, a deferential attitude towards the
authority of the legislature is apparent. There has been a concern expressed that at times
of economic crisis the state may transgress beyond the acceptable limits of such
intervention; in a manner which infringes the rights of some citizens in favour of private
gain for others, in order to stimulate economic growth. However, these concerns are
misplaced. The very fact that the initial beneficiary of a development is a private actor is
not sufficient to conclude that no public benefit will accrue from a compulsory
acquisition, no more than the very fact that a private actor is not involved is sufficient to
conclude that a public benefit will result.
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Therefore, the concern of the law should not be whether to provide absolute protection
to private land owners from all forms of acquisition which ostensibly benefit private
actors to a greater degree than the public. Rather, the aim of the law should be to
regulate the market and the state in a manner which balances those competing variables
alongside a concern for justice – or emancipation – which may not inherently favour
either state or market. Through the doctrine of proportionality, as outlined in Tuohy, this
is the approach of the Irish courts to disputes regarding compulsory acquisition,
irrespective of whether the acquisition is purely public in nature, or includes a private
dimension.
The above does not imply that the role of private or cooperative bargaining is redundant;
in many cases it is preferable. The notion of institutional diversity, as espoused by Elinor
Ostrom, can indeed serve as a model for providing greater legitimacy to decisions by
local authorities to compulsorily acquire land in their locality. The strengthening of
citizen participation in such bodies, alongside experts, would make less likely the
reactionary outcome of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo. However, it must be
recognised that such bargaining has natural limitations, particularly where one party acts
as a “hold in” in an area earmarked for necessary regeneration.
It is likely that a case with facts synonymous to Kelo will come before the Irish Supreme
Court at some point in the future. Given the past record of the court, provided an
acquisition similar to that in Kelo is not so repugnant as to constitute an unjust attack on
one’s constitutional rights, it seems likely that the Supreme Court will follow the path
their American counterparts. Given the fact that the Supreme Court’s general deference
to the legislature in these matters has not aroused any great political debate in the past,
it is unlikely that a decision synonymous to Kelo would spark an outcry similar to that
which occurred in America. However, the adoption of a model of increasing institutional
diversity, as outlined above, is likely to give greater democratic legitimacy to such
acquisitions. This would make even less likely a populist movement aimed at imposing
undue restrictions on the state’s ability to exercise its power of compulsory acquisition.
Such institutional diversity should be particularly encouraged during periods of economic
crisis, when disputes of the nature outlined in this essay are increasingly likely to occur.
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